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ABSTRACT: Abduction* is the genus with deduction and induction as species. Modus tollens is backward 
reasoning as an unknown proposition is inferred from a known proposition. Reductio ad absurdum is 
abductive because the conclusion is inferred by deriving a contradiction from an assumption. Inductive 
reasoning from effect to cause is also backward reasoning. But abduction* consists of forward reasoning as 
well. The generic structure of abductive* argumentation is universal among all cultures, occupations and 
disciplines. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
If we are to give the names of Deduction, Induction, and Abduction to the three grand classes of 
inference, then Deduction must include every attempt at mathematical demonstration, [….] 
Induction must mean the operation that induces an assent, [.…]  Abduction must cover all the 
operations by which theories and conceptions are engendered (Peirce 1957, p. 237). 
 
Though Peirce demarcates abduction from deduction and induction, “all the operations” 
is a cue to consider “abduction*”1 as all inferential reasoning of which deduction and 
induction are species that have caught philosophers’ attention. For Peirce the complement 
subset “abduction” is essential to scientific reasoning.  
 
The inference from agreeing perceptions to physical objects is abductive in Peirce’s sense, that is it 
makes an inference from effects to causes, from observations to their best explanations” 
(Niiniluoto 1999, p. 39).  
 
If abduction is reasoning backward from effects to causes then most inductive arguments 
are abductive. However, many empiricists claim that inductive arguments lead to 
generalizations that may not be causal laws. Hence, some inductive arguments are not 
backward reasoning. Niiniluoto demarcates abduction from deduction:  
                                                 
1 I will use “abduction*” to designate the genus abduction that includes all forms of inferential reasoning of 
which deduction and induction are species; and I will use “abduction” to refer to the subset of abduction* 
that excludes deduction and induction. 
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An abductive argument is not deductive, and it cannot guarantee certainty to its conclusion. It is an 
ampliative inference, which at best gives some credibility (or epistemic probability) to the 
conclusion. (Ibid., p. 39) 
 
Abduction is considered backward reasoning: “Systems of abductive, backward 
reasoning can be exploited to turn up Cartesian proofs.” (Clark 1982, p. 8); “The 
diagnostic procedure for causal AND/OR/NOT graphs is an abduction procedure, 
abduction is backward reasoning […]” (Oleskiak 2004, p. 31); “The most frequently 
discussed pattern of selective abduction is backward reasoning through given causal 
laws” (Schurz 2008, p. 4);  
 
Abductive logical programming is a computational framework that extends normal logic 
programming with abduction. [….] used to generate by means of backward reasoning, [...] 
(www.absoluteastronomy.com 2009).  
 
Isn’t “ampliative” forward rather than backward reasoning, literally, as the 
conclusion is not contained in the premises, and metaphorically, since according to Peirce 
science would remain backward without it? 
Magnani (2001) claims:  
 
In theoretical analysis, reasoning goes backward from theorems to axioms—from effects to 
causes—from which they deductively follow (p. 2). [….] In my epistemological model, forward 
reasoning […] is consistent with selective abduction while backward reasoning […] is consistent 
with the deduction–induction cycle, because both deal with an inference from hypotheses to data 
(pp. 78-9).  
 
Magnani concludes that deduction and induction are backward reasoning and abduction is 
forward reasoning:  
 
It is interesting that conventional curricula […] and problem-based learning curricula […] lead 
students, when they generate explanations, to develop respectively selective abductions (forward 
reasoning) or to perform the whole abduction-deduction-induction cycle using relevant biomedical 
information (backward reasoning) (Ibid., p. 91). 
 
Whereas backward reasoning may be associated with abduction when integrated with 
deduction and induction in a cycle, forward reasoning is associated solely with abduction. 
 
Moreover I have tried to show that the idea of abductive reasoning might be a flexible 
epistemological interface between other related notions (induction and deduction, best explanation, 
perception, forward and backward reasoning, defeasibility, discovery, and so on) (Ibid., p. 94).  
 
This is why I include forward as well as backward reasoning in abduction*. 
I demonstrate that the deductive argument forms of modus tollens and reductio ad 
absurdum are backward reasoning.  
 My final motivation comes from another pioneer of abduction in Norwood Russell 
Hanson: 
 
The logic of Proof (i.e. deductive logic) has claimed philosophers’ attention more than the logic of 
Discovery [….] Logicians of science have described how one might set out reasons in support of 
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an hypothesis once it is proposed [.…] There are two exceptions: Aristotle and Peirce. When they 
discussed what Peirce called “retroduction,” both recognized that the proposal of an hypothesis is 
often a reasonable affair (1958, p. 1073). 
 
Hanson goes against mainstream philosophy of science which focuses on the context of 
justification rather than on the context of discovery. Abduction* covers both contexts. 
 
2. HISTORIC ROOTS OF ABDUCTION 
 
Western philosophy began in Asia with the quest for ultimate constituents as Aristotle 
states: Most of the first philosophers thought that principles in the form of matter were 
the only principles of all things; […] Thales […] says it is water” (Kirk, Raven and 
Schofield 1983, #85, p. 89). As a scientist Thales observed that the earth floats on water 
but to derive “everything is water” from this is neither inductive nor deductive. Rather, 
“[…] the reasons given for Thales’ choice of water are professedly conjectural” (Ibid., p. 
90). 
Conjecturing hypotheses is based on complex reasons that are not ad hoc. For 
Aristotle Thales’s reasons were “mainly physiological” (Ibid., p. 91). But they had a 
wider historical and cultural grounding besides being founded on all the scientific 
knowledge available at the time:  
 
Thales would no doubt be encouraged and gratified to have the apparently native Homeric 
precedents. Thus Thales’ view that the earth floats on water seems to have been most probably 
based upon direct contact with near eastern mythological cosmology. We have already seen that he 
had associations both with Babylonia and with Egypt. The idea that the earth actually floats upon 
water was more clearly and more widely held in the latter of these countries; and the conjecture 
may be hazarded that Thales was indebted to Egypt for this element of his world-picture (Ibid., p. 
93). 
 
A comprehensive philology has to invert the Eurocentrism that conventionally pervades 
in recording history. The standard history takes us to the Egyptian civilization vertically 
as the antecedent of the Ancient Greek civilization so that Thales would be directly 
influenced by the Homeric tradition of Ancient Greece that preceded him, which in turn 
would be influenced by the earlier Egyptians. The authors of The Presocratic 
Philosophers give this credibility since it is Darwinian in terms of tracing origins, but 
they simultaneously state that the horizontal influences of the Greeks, Egyptians and the 
near east were factors. Guthrie (1962) supports these horizontal influences:  
 
Some point to the undoubted fact that he lived in a country familiar with both Babylonian and 
Egyptian ideas, and, according to an unchallenged tradition, had himself visited Egypt. In both 
these civilizations water played a preponderant part which was reflected in their mythology” (p. 
58).  
 
Hence, Thales’s reasoning for this conjecture is abductive.  
Chrysippus (3rd Century BCE) formulates modus tollens: “If the first, then the 
second; but not the second; therefore, not the first” (Spade 2002, p. 39). Earlier Plato and 
Aristotle made abundant use of modus tollens. One of Thales’s students probably 
constructed the following objection: 
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If everything is water, then everything is wet. 
Some things are not wet. 
Therefore, Not everything is water. 
 
The following form is generated after converting “some things are not wet” to “not 
everything is wet”: 
 
p  q 
~q 
 ~p 
 
In modus tollens like in all deductively valid arguments the conclusion follows from the 
premises, hence it comes after the premises.  
The Rg Veda2 provides another early formulation: 
 
If everything is A, then A is nothing in particular. 
A is not nothing in particular. 
Therefore, not everything is A. (McEvilley 2003, p. 30) 
 
This generalized form can be used against positing any element as urstoff of the world. 
These historic arguments begin with the intention to demonstrate ~p. Modus 
tollens is commonly used in modern scientific reasoning. A hypothesis can be stated as a 
conditional statement and a counterexample that negates the consequent hence leads to 
the denial of the antecedent: 
 
If x is within the atmosphere of Earth with no counteracting forces in play, then x will fall to the 
ground when dropped. 
x does not fall to the ground when dropped. 
Therefore, it is not the case that x is within the atmosphere of Earth with no counteracting forces in 
play. 
 
From the observation of x not falling to the ground we conclude that either we are not 
within the Earth’s atmosphere which would surely be observed at the moment or that 
there are counteracting forces, which may not at the moment be observed. Hence, modus 
tollens is backward reasoning from something observed to something  unobserved.  
Modus tollens is also used to reject hypotheses: 
 
If Newton’s principle of reaction is correct, then the principle of relativity is incorrect. 
The principle of relativity is correct (not incorrect). 
Therefore, Newton’s principle of reaction is incorrect.3 
 
This is not forward reasoning because some empirical evidence leads us to reject 
Newton’s third law. Rather, the principle of relativity, confirmed or verified by 
experiment, leads to the rejection of the principle of reaction which is inconsistent with it. 
Modus tollens generates reductio ad absurdum arguments:  
                                                 
2 Although there is a controversy about when the Rg Veda was written, it is usually dated as being earlier 
than 1000 BCE. See for example: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rigveda. 
 
3 This labeling of the principles is from (Darrigol 1995, p. 1). 
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(1) Assume not-p  
(2) Provide argumentation that derives any contradiction (q  ~q ) from this assumption. 
(3) Maintain p on this basis (Rescher, 2006). 
 
This is schematized as: 
~p  As the assumption of the reductio 
~p  (q  ~q) Derived from premises and conditional proof 
~(q  ~q) The law of non contradiction 
 ~~p  Modus tollens on the previous two lines 
p  Double negation on previous line 
 
Zeno employed reductio arguments abundantly. Rescher states:  
 
The use of such reductio argumentation was common in Greek mathematics and was also used by 
philosophers in antiquity and beyond. Aristotle employed it in the Prior Analytics to demonstrate 
the so-called imperfect syllogisms when it had already been used in dialectical contexts by Plato 
[….] Kant's entire discussion of the antinomies in his Critique of Pure Reason was based on 
reductio argumentation (Ibid.). 
 
The proof of Euclid’s proposition 4 uses reductio: 
 
[….] hence the base BC will coincide with the base EF. 
     [For if, B coincides with E and C with F, the base BC does not coincide with the base EF, two 
straight lines will enclose a space: which is impossible. Therefore the base BC will coincide with 
the base EF] and will be equal to it. [C.N. 4] (Heath 1956, p. 248) 
 
Euclid employed reductio in the proof of the first proposition that was not a construction. 
Reductio arguments are paradigms of backward reasoning as the conclusion is in mind 
before beginning the reductio that is generated on the assumption of the negation of the 
conclusion. Hence, intuitionist logicians are weary of the viability of reductios (Ibid.), 
based on the assumption that natural deduction provides forward reasoning that is 
ampliative: “The nine rules of inference listed above represent ways of inferring 
something new from previous steps in a deduction” (Klement, 2006).  
 
3. SACCHERI’S REDUCTIO PROOF OF EUCLID’S FIFTH POSTULATE 
 
Saccheri provided a proof of Euclid’s fifth postulate (Halsted, 1986). In the process of 
showing the contradiction that follows from each of the alternatives to the parallel 
postulate, Saccheri invented non-Euclidean geometry but did not recognize “the 
legitimacy of his creation” (Ibid., p. viii).  
In Book I Saccheri uses a reductio proof to establish the parallel postulate. He 
begins by forming the Saccheri quadrilateral in which the base angles are right angles. 
Now he needs to show that the summit angles will also be right angles. First, the two 
summit angles are proven to be equal, so we need only show that one of the summit 
angles is a right angle. Saccheri proposes the exhaustive disjunction that this angle is 
either (a) right angle, or (b) obtuse angle, or (c) acute angle. He then uses reductio 
arguments to demonstrate why the assumptions of (b) and (c) lead to contradictions so 
that each is false. Hence, by disjunctive syllogism (a) is true. Saccheri did not use 
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Euclid’s fifth postulate, nor definition 23 of “parallel” nor any of Euclid’s propositions 
that have used either the fifth postulate or definition 23 in their proofs. Hence, Saccheri 
successfully proved Euclid’s fifth postulate deductively without begging the question.  
However, “In the 33rd theorem is found Saccheri's ‘flaw,’ where he breaks away 
from his rigorous logic and carefully crafted ‘perfect’ structure and, as it were in 
disbelief, remarks ‘[…] but this is contrary to our intuitive knowledge of a straight line’” 
(Fairfield 2005). The proof of proposition XXXIII contains a reductio transformed into 
modus tollens:   
 
(α) If two straight lines AB and CD fall on the same straight line then they enclose a space. 
(β) Neither AB nor CD can enclose a space.  
  Therefore, (γ) AB and CD do not fall on the same line (Ibid., pp. 173-7). 
 
Saccheri was careful not to beg the question. But he jumped to the conclusion. Both (α) 
and (β) are unwarranted. They are not derived from any of the first four postulates, 
definitions 1 through 22 and the common notions. What else is allowed in a proof? Any 
logically true propositions are allowed. (α) or (β) are obviously not logically true. Hence, 
two tacit premises are needed for the proof of the fifth postulate to go through. Lambert 
took the flaw to be that of applying “properties at infinity that are only true in finite 
ranges” (McCleary 1994, p. 38).4  
Saccheri therefore stands refuted. However, the extensive proofs of five lemmas, 
four corollaries and two scolia to proposition XXXIII based on the Euclidean definitions 
of point, straight line, and so on; do recursively and rigorously establish the two tacit 
premises (Ibid., pp. 173-207). Hence, proposition XXXIII, “The hypothesis of acute angle 
is absolutely false; because repugnant to the nature of the straight line” (Ibid., p. 173), is 
soundly established as Saccheri states: “I shall take the utmost care not to pass over any 
objection, however pedantic it might seem, since it appears to me that this is appropriate 
to a highly rigorous proof” (Halsted, p. 251)5. Furthermore in Book II Saccheri gave an 
independent proof of (α) and (β). Neither Euclid nor Saccheri nor any geometer in 
between had the notion of a curvilinear line though they had the notions of curves and 
arcs.  
After Gauss, Bolyai, Lobachevski and Riemann we have the following picture:   
 
 
 
The three lines, one straight AB and two curvilinear CD and EF all lie on the same line 
though not on the same straight line. If “line” is disambiguated as “straight line” or 
“curvilinear line” then Saccheri is wrong. The notion of curvilinear lines was 
                                                 
4 This may not be fair to Saccheri as the 19th century of infinity that Cantor probably used is being applied 
backward to Saccheri who probably did not accept actual infinities as probably Euclid would not have 
earlier and Kant would not have later. 
5 This is provided by Halsted as an alternative translation to the one provided in the text of theorem XXXIII 
on page 173 as: “But since I am here to go into the very first principles, I shall diligently take care, that I 
omit nothing objected almost too scrupulously, which indeed I recognize to the most exact demonstration. 
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inconceivable to Saccheri (Ibid., p. ix). However, if “line” is disambiguated only as 
“straight line” then Saccheri is not wrong. The fifth postulate is then true and proven to 
be true. Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries are reconciled with the general meaning 
of “line” as either “straight line” (Euclidean) or “curvilinear line” (non-Euclidean). This 
ambiguous notion of “line” lies in analysis situs (topology), or “general geometry”:  
 
C’est pourquoi ils ont imaginé ce qu’ils appellent <<la géométrie générale>>, qui comprend 
comme cas particuliers les trios systèmes d’Euclide, de Lobatchevsky et de Riemann, et qui n’en 
comprend pas d’autres. Et cette épithète de << générale>> signife évidemment, dans leur esprit, 
qu’aucune autre géométrie n’est concevable (Poincaré 1913, p. 162). 
 
Poincaré’s conjecture that these three geometries are the only geometries possible is an 
abductive inference based on the assumption that “line” can only be disambiguated as 
“straight” or “concavely curvilinear” or “convexly curvilinear.” 
With the disambiguation of “line” as “straight or curvilinear” or even as 
“curvilinear” but not as “straight”; Saccheri’s (β) is false as neither do AB and CD 
together, nor AB and EF together, nor CD and EF together, nor AB, CD and DE all 
together enclose a space. Hence, the only fallacy in Saccheri’s argument is an inadvertent 
but happy fallacy of equivocation. The discovery of this equivocation is purely abductive 
and backward reasoning literally as well as historically. At his time Saccheri was not 
equivocating but looking at his argument today he is equivocating. Furthermore, the 
notion of curvilinear lines is not a deductive consequence of the possible falsity of 
Euclid’s fifth postulate, but is a conjecture of a possibility and the actual construction of a 
curvilinear line. It is purely abductive and it pronounces the victory of constructivism and 
intuitionism over logicism and formalism.  
  
4. KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT AS ABDUCTIVE 
 
Kant’s transcendental deduction is abductive.6 I restrict myself to the transcendental 
argument for space as an intuition in the transcendental aesthetics (Kant 1855, pp. 37-41). 
The argument is captured by “Space then is a necessary representation a priori, which 
serves for the foundation of all external intuitions” (Ibid., p. 38). This is called a 
“deduction” because it has the form of modus ponens: 
 
There are perceptions7; 
if there are perceptions, then there is an a priori intuition of space; 
Therefore, there is an a priori intuition of space. 
 
The conditional “if…then” is not material but transcendental as at least in the fourth row 
of the truth table where both ‘there are perceptions’ and ‘there is an a priori intuition of 
space’ are false, the conditional is also false. 
                                                 
6 Lawson considers Kant’s transcendental deduction as a species of abduction (Guala, p. 8). Wahid claims: 
“Transcendental arguments have been described as disclosing the necessary conditions of the possibility of 
phenomena [….] ‘no different from Peircian abduction’ […]” (2002, p. 273). Beth (2007) states: “Peirce’s 
abduction has a form similar to transcendental argumentation, in that it infers to a possible explanatory 
principle, [….]” (p. 16). Overton (2002) claims: “A form of abduction was brought to prominence by Kant” 
(p. 48).  
7 I mean by “perceptions” here what are for Kant commonly called “external appearances.” 
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Kant’s argument may be disambiguated in four ways: perceptions are not possible 
without the intuition of space, knowledge through perception is not possible without the a 
priori knowledge of the intuition of space, knowledge through perception is not possible 
without the intuition of space, and perception is not possible without the a priori 
knowledge of the intuition of space. These may be schematized as: 
 
[TAS]m  Perceptions exist8;  
 if perceptions exist, then space exists as an intuition; 
 therefore, space exists as an intuition. 
[TAS]e   Knowledge of perceptions exists;  
if knowledge of perceptions exists, then a priori knowledge of space as an intuition 
exists; 
 therefore, a priori knowledge of space as an intuition exists. 
[TAS]em Knowledge of perceptions exist;  
 if knowledge of perceptions exists, then space exists as an intuition; 
 therefore, space exists as an intuition. 
[TAS]me Perceptions exist;  
 if perceptions exist, then a priori knowledge of space as an intuition exists; 
 therefore, a priori knowledge of space as an intuition exists. 
    
Perhaps Kant intends to present all four. [TAS]m is a metaphysical argument, 
[TAS]e is an epistemological argument,   [TAS]em is an epistemo-metaphysical argument 
as it starts from the knowledge of perceptions and ends with the existence of space as an 
intuition in the conclusion. [TAS]me is a metaphysico-epistemological argument as it 
starts from the existence of perceptions and ends with the knowledge of space as an a 
priori intuition.  
The metaphysical argument is precarious since it is not clear whether by 
“perception” Kant means the sensation in the mind or the phenomenal object or both. 
Taken in one direction it leads to idealism. Kant may wish to make the epistemological 
argument, but it is simply unsound because the conditional is not true. I can have 
knowledge of perception without having a priori knowledge of the intuition of space. The 
epistemo-metaphysical argument is sound. I do have knowledge of perceptions, and this 
knowledge implies the existence of space as an intuition since what I perceive exists in 
space. The metaphysico-epistemological argument is unsound, as perceptions obviously 
exist whether or not I have a priori knowledge of space as an intuition.  
The transcendental conditional in the metaphysical argument is not a material 
conditional but is a causal conditional and that is why from a realist perspective it is false. 
In the epistemological argument, when interpreted as a causal conditional, it is simply 
false from any epistemological point of view. As a causal conditional it is true in the 
epistemo-metaphysical argument and false in the metaphysico-epistemological argument. 
The standard conception of abduction as backward reasoning is reconciled with 
Magnani’s contention that it is forward reasoning. Abduction* is the genus of reasoning, 
either forward or backward, that humans use in supporting claims by providing reasons 
which can take varying forms from classical deductive and inductive models to analogies 
to metaphors to allegories to model theoretic reasoning to other complex types of 
                                                 
8 Although I am not comfortable with the use of ‘exists’ here as I agree with Leibniz and Russell that 
existence is not a first order property of objects, I am using it for convenience here. 
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modeling. Hence, no matter how we characterize Kant’s transcendental deduction it is 
abductive*. We may debate about which species of abduction* it is. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
My conjecture is that arguments in the sense of providing reasons for one’s claims are 
common to all cultures historically, vertically as well as horizontally. Emphasis on 
deductive reasoning, especially of the type that is grounded in presocratic Ionia such as 
that provided by Thales and perfected later in Egypt by Euclid, perhaps creates an ethnic 
bias and at the same time decries the universality of deductive reasoning making it 
culture specific. However, since persons with varied cultural backgrounds use such 
deductive reasoning the apparent ethnic bias disappears. Induction is perhaps much wider 
in terms of its presence in all cultures, as it seems like everyone uses induction in their 
day to day lives and not just the scientists. Even non human animals use induction when 
they refuse to put their limbs in fire once they realize that fire burns them. Yet, the way 
induction is presented as the core of the scientific enterprise it is formalized as if it is 
culture specific to scientific cultures. I claim that all cultures use abduction* as a form of 
reasoning which encompasses forward as well as backward reasoning. Whereas the 
species of deduction and induction may not be common to all cultures, other species of 
abduction* are common to all cultures. I am sure that it can be empirically confirmed that 
all humans across all cultures at present or at any time in history, are capable of all the 
species of abductive* reasoning, whether it be deduction, induction, model theoretic, 
analogical, or abduction. 
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